Intent-Based Network Management in SRv6 network

Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defines a framework and interfaces for interacting with Network Security Functions (NSFs) . Note that an NSF is defined as software that provides a set of security-related services, such as (i) detecting unwanted activity, (ii) blocking or mitigating the effect of such unwanted activity in order to fulfill service requirements, and (iii) supporting communication stream integrity and confidentiality . Th e NSF can be implemented as a Virtual Network Function (VNF) in a Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environment . The term "intent" is defined as "an abstract, high-level policy used to operate the network" in the context of autonomic networks . According to this definition, an intent is a specific type of policy provided by a user to provide guidance to the autonomic network that would otherwise operate without human intervention. Intent-Based Networking (IBN) Management (IBNM) aims to lead towards networks that are fundamentally simpler to manage and operate, requiring only minimal outside intervention. The IBNM supports a closed-loop network control architecture that can adapt to the current status of a target network by collecting and analyzing monitoring data from Network Service Functions (NSFs) of I2NSF framework. NSFs can be either Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) or Physical Network Functions (PNFs) in cloud and edge computing environments. Segment Routing (SR) allows a node to steer a packet flow along any path. The headend (i.e., ingress router) is a node where the instructions for source routing (i.e., segments) are written into the packet. It hence becomes the starting node for a specific segment routing path. Intermediate per-path states are eliminated thanks to source routing. and describe the same for Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) with the use of the Segment Routing Header (SRH). Therefore, the instructions for source routing is made by a Segment Routing Policy (SR Policy) . The SR policy is an ordered list of segments and come from the Intent, which is given by users (i.e., network operators). According to the Intent, IBNM will support several funtionalities.

This document uses the terminology described in , , , and . In addition, the following terms are defined below: Autonomous Network Management (ANM): It means that an intent from a user (or administrator or network operator) is well-enforced in a target SRv6 network. The intent can be aligned with high-level network policy and then high-level network policy can be translated into the corresponding low-level network policy (including SRv6 Policy) by a network policy translator and dispatched to appropriate NSFs. Through the monitoring of the NSFs, the activity and performace of the NSFs is monitored and analyzed whether or not NSFs are operating well according to the intent of the users. If needed, the network rules of the low-level network and SRv6 policy are augmented or new network rules are generated and configured to appropriate NSFs. Network Policy Translation (NPT): It means that a high-level network policy is translated to a low-level network policy (including SRv6 policy) that can be understood and configured by an NSF for autonomous network services, such as self-configuration, self-optimization, self-healing, and self-protection. Feedback-Based Network Management (FNM): It means that a network service in SRv6 network is evolved by updating a network policy (i.e., a set of network rules) and adding new network rules for resolving network problems, which were detected by monitoring and analzing data from NSFs.

| Vendor's Mgmt System | +-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+ ^ ^ ^ | | Software Update Interface | | | (Down) | | | Analytics Interface +----------------+ | | +------------------------>| IBN Analyzer | | | +----------------+ | | NSF-Facing Interface ^ | | | | | +---------------------+ | | | Monitoring Interface | | | | +---------+------------------+--------------------------------+----+ | v v SRv6 Nodes v | | +---------------+ +---------------+ +---------------+ | | | NSF-1 |--| NSF-2 | ....... | NSF-n | | | |(Policy Control| | (Monitoring | | (Application | | | | Function, PCF)| | Function, MF)| | Function, AF) | | | +---------------+ +---------------+ +---------------+ | +------------------------------------------------------------------+ ]]>

This section describes an IBNM framework in SRv6 network. Note that this IBNM Framework is based on the Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) . As shown in , an IBN User can use network functions by delivering high-level network intents, which specify network requirements that the IBNM User wants to enforce, to the IBN Controller via the Consumer-Facing Interface (CFI).

The following are the system components for the IBNM framework in SRv6 network. IBN User: An entity (e.g., End User or Network Operator) that delivers a high-level network policy (including SRv6 policy) to Security Controller. It is assumed that (i) an intent in a natural language (e.g., English) can be translated into a high-level network policy through a Natural Language Processing (called NLP) technique (e.g., Lumi ) (ii) an intent as a network service (e.g., self-configuration, optimization, and healing) can be also translated into a high-level network policy. IBN Controller: An entity that controls and manages other system components in the IBNM framework. It translates a high-level network policy into the corresponding low-level network policy and selects appropriate NSFs to execute the network rules of the low-level network policy. And then these NSFs are distributed and enabled into SRv6 nodes according to SRv6 policy (i.e., list of source routing). Vendor's Management System (VMS): An entity that provides an image of of a virtualized NSF for a network service to the IBNM framework, registers the capability and access information of an NSF with IBN Controller, and downloads NSFs into appropriate SRv6 nodes. These downloaded NSFs will be updated dynamically if needed but is controlled by IBN controller. These virtualized NSFs are managed through the cloud-based distribed database. Network Service Function (NSF): An entity that is a Virtual Network Function (called VNF), Physical Network Function (called PNF) and Container Network Function (CNF), which is also called Cloud-native Network Function, for a autonomous network service. IBN Analyzer: An entity that collects monitoring data from NSFs and analyzes such data for checking the activity and performance of the NSFs using machine learning techniques (e.g., Deep Learning ). If there is a suspicious network problem (e.g., traffic congestion and QoS degradation) for the target network or NSF, IBN Analyzer delivers a report of the augmentation or generation of network rules to IBN Controller. For IBN-based network services with Feedback-Based Network Management (FNM), IBN Analyzer is a key component for the IBNM framework to collect monitoring data from NSFs and analyzing the monitoring data. In here, SRv6 is used to distinguish the monitoring data. Ingress node (i.e., Headend) in SRv6 domain adds monitoring information (e.g., intent and monitoring tag) into SRv6 headers. And then, intermediate nodes monitor and analyze IPv6 packets with monitoring information. The actual implementation of the analysis of monitoring data is out of the scope of this document.

The following are the interfaces for the IBNM framework. Note that the interfaces can be modeled with YANG and network policies are delivered through either RESTCONF or NETCONF . In addition, REST API can be supported for those software update interfaces. Consumer-Facing Interface (CFI): An interface between IBN User and IBN Controller for the delivery of a high-level network policy or a intent . NSF-Facing Interface (NFI): An interface between IBN Controller and an NSF for the delivery of a low-level network policy . Registration Interface (RI): An interface between a VMS and IBN Controller for the registration of an NSF's capability and access information with the IBN Controller or the query of an NSF for a required low-level network policy . Software Update Interface (Up) (SUI-U): An interface between a VMS and global distribed database for NSF management. Software Update Interface (Down) (SUI-D): An interface between a VMS and a SRv6 node for delivery of a NSF. The NSF is just downloaded and does not work. After the command of IBN Controller through NFI, it works. Monitoring Interface (MI): An interface between an NSF and IBN Analyzer for collecting monitoring data from an NSF to check the activity and performance of an NSF for a possible network problem . In here, IPv6 packets with monitoring information in SRv6 heeder is only collected. Analytics Interface (AI): An interface between IBN Analyzer and IBN Controller for the delivery of an analytics report of the augmentation or generation of network rules to IBN Controller, which lets IBN Controller apply the report for network rules to its network policy management. For IBN-based network services with FSM, Analytics Interface is a key interface in the IBNM framework to deliver an analytics report of the augmentation or generation of network rules to IBN Controller through the analysis of the monitoring data from NSFs. For analyzing, user's intent of monitoring information in SRv6 header will compare with just monitoring data from NSFs.

To facilitate Network Policy Translation (NPT), IBN Controller needs to have a network policy translator that performs the translation of a high-level network policy into the corresponding low-level network policy. For the automatic NPT services, the IBN framework needs to bridge a high-level YANG data model and a low-level YANG data model in an automatic manner . Note that a high-level YANG data model is for the IBN Consumer-Facing Interface, and a low-level YANG data model is for the IBN NSF-Facing Interface. shows automatic mapping of high-level and low-level data models for network policies. Automatic Data Model Mapper takes a high-level YANG data module for the Consumer-Facing Inteface and a low-level YANG data module for the NSF-Facing Interface. It then constructs a mapping table associating the data attributes (or variables) of the high-level YANG data module with the corresponding data attributes (or variables) of the low-level YANG data module. Also, it generates a set of production rules of the grammar for the construction of an XML file of low-level network policy rules.

The IBN framework is weak to both an insider attack and a supply chain attack since it trusts in NSFs provided by VMS and assumes that NSFs work for their network services appropriately . To detect the malicious activity of either an insider attack by a malicious VMS or a supply chain attack by a compromised VMS, a network audit system is required by the IBN framework. This network audit system can facilitate the non-repudiation of configuration commands and monitoring data generated in the IBN framework. A network audit system has the following four main objectives: To check the existence of a network policy, a management system, and its procedures; To identify and understand the existing vulnerabilities and risks of either an insider attack or a supply chain attack; To review existing network controls on operational and administrative issues; To provide recommendations and corrective actions to IBN Controller for further network and security improvement.

| Audit | | | ^ | System | +--------------+--------------+ | +---------+--------+ | NSF-Facing Interface | ^ | | Remote | Low-level Security Policy | Attestation | | | Interface | V | | +--------------+--------------+ | +--------+-------+ | NSF(s) +------------+ | IBN Analyzer | | +------------------>| | +-----------------------------+ Monitoring +----------------+ Interface ]]> shows activity auditing with a network audit system in the IBN framework. All the components in the IBN framwork report its activities (such as configuration commands and monitoring data) to Network Audit System as transactions through Remote Attestation Interface . The network audit system can analyze the reported activities from the IBN components to detect malicious activities such as an insider attack and a supply chain attack. Note that such a network audit system can be implemented by remote attestation or Blockchain . The details of the implementation of the network audit system are out of the scope of this document. In order to determine a minimum set of controls required to reduce the risks from either an insider attack or a supply chain attack, the network audit system should analyze the activities of all the components in the IBN framework periodically, evaluate possible risks, and take an action to such risks since vulnerabilities and threats may change in different environments over time.

This document does not require any IANA actions.

The same security considerations for the IBN framework are applicable to this document.